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then must enforce the title gained in state B or that of state A. 7 The
question is usually further complicated by the fact that no new trans-
action has occurred in state C."8 Some of the writers have felt this
involves a question of due process and full faith and credit under the
Federal Constitution.' 9 The problem of the action of other states
toward the new Ohio title is, therfore, one which Ohio courts should
not overlook.20  A.B.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - CIVIL LIBERTIES - PEACEABLE
ASSEMBLY- VALIDITY OF ORDINANCE REQUIRING
DISPERSAL OF CROWD
Defendant was convicted of violating a village ordinance which pro-
vided: "That it shall be unlawful for three or more persons to assemble
. . . on any of the sidewalks, streets, avenues, alleys or parks . . . or
to refuse or neglect, on being notified by the Marshall or Police Officer
to do so, to forthwith quietly disperse." The facts showed that defendant
and a few friends had been standing on a sidewalk, ostensibly behaving
themselves in a quiet manner, the only basis of conviction being the
refusal to "move on" at the police officer's command. The Court of
Common Pleas of Hamilton County reversed the conviction and held
the ordinance unconstitutional as being repugnant to the guarantee of
peaceable assembly found in Article I, Section 3 of the Ohio Constitution
and the Fourteenth Amendment.'
In the past, although a few jurisdictions have invalidated legislative
exertions of similar character on grounds of infringement of state con-
stitutional guaranties,2 such ordinances have generally been sustained
as valid exercises of municipal police power. Thus the municipal power
to prevent obstruction of traffic,' to abate nuisances, 4 to prevent breaches
'1 Forgan v. Bainbridge, 34 Ariz. 408, 274 Pac. ISS (x928) refused to recognize
the new title, on the basis of reciprocity; but see Edgerly v. Bush, Si N. Y. gg (iSso).
Contra: Fuller v. Webster, 5 Boyce 538, 95 A. 335, (Del. 1915).
'Leflor, Jurisdiction Over Tangible Chattels, (937), z U. Mo. L. Rrv. 171; also
see note 9, supra.
a' Dodd, Power of the Supreme Court to Review State Decisions in the Field of
Conflict of Laws (1926) 39 HARv. L. Rev. 533; Ross, Has The Conflict of Laws Become
a Branch of Constitutional Law? (931) 25 MINN. L. REv. z6s.
0 Generally see Carnahan, Tangibles In The Conflict of Laws, (1935) Z U. OF CHI.
L. Rav. 345-
'Deer Park (Village) v. Schuster, 30 Ohio L. Abs. 466, 16 Ohio Op. 485 (1940).
'State v. Coleman, 96 Conn. 29o, 113 AtI. 385 (z922); State v. Hunter, io6 N.C.
796, i S.E. 366, 8 L.R.A. 529 (289o).
'People v. Pierce, 85 App. Div. 125, 83 N.Y.S. 79 (1903).
' Commonwealth v. Surridge, 265 Mass. 425, 164. N.E. 480 (929).
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of the peace,' to punish disorderly conduct,6 and to penalize loitering7
has overcome defense predicated on the privilege of assembly. Authority
for this favorable judicial attitude toward municipal action was always
traced to the Massachusetts case of Commonwealth v. Davis,' an early
decision of Holmes, J., affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United
States.' That decision was significant for its analogization of the munici-
pality, in its control of its streets, parks, and other public places, to the
private owner of land; the plenary power of the city there given legal
currency bespoke the validity of local legislation, however broad.
The status of the Davis case as conditioning precedent was central
in the recent but celebrated Jersey City litigation;'" and the virtual
repudiation of the Holmesian viewpoint attests the profound impact
upon the scope of municipal power by the finding of the guarantee of
free assembly in the Fourteenth Amendment. No longer can the city
treat assemblage as the consquence of governmental grace; the right
to come together now sets restrictive limits on what a few short years
ago was power without effective check. In such a constitutional pattern
ther is no place for municipal legislation of the coverage pregnant in
that litigated here. So much is clear from Hague v. C.I.O.; if further
proof be needed there lies at hand the recent fate of handbill ordinances
drawn in broad, conclusive terms.'"
These developments together with the logic of the thing make the
action of the Court of Common Pleas unquestionably consistent with
the philosophy of the national Supreme Court. Nor was the local court
judicially out of step because the administrative action taken was scarcely
by way of previous restraint. On its facts, it is true, the Hague decision
but vouchsafed the constitutional right against the governmental censor.
Yet judicial signposts have not been lacking for the proposition that
the guaranty extends to aftermath as well. Analogies are close from
the related rights of speech' 3 and circulation; 4 but more than this,
rPeople v. Sinclair, S6 Misc. Rep. 426, 149 N.Y.S. 54 (x914), affrd 167 App. Div.
899, iSi N.Y.S. 1136 (I915).
'State v. Galpern, 259 N.Y. 279, 131 N.E. 572 (1932).
7 State v. Jasmin, 105 Vt. 531 (x933).
16z Alass. 510, 39 N.E. 113 (1895).
'67 U.S. 43, 17 Sup. Ct. 731, 42 L. Ed. 71 (1897).
"'Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 59 Sup. Ct. 954, 83 L. Ed. 1423 (1939).
' Note io, supra.
"The effect upon municipal handbill power by the emergence of the right to freely
circularize is succinctly summarized in (940) 6 O.S.L.J. 195.
'That the right to speak freely safeguards against subsequent punishment as well as
prior restraint, one of the constitutional issues resolved in the 1931 civil liberties cases,
has recently been reafrmed in the anti-picketing decisions. See Thornhill v. Alabama,
-U.S.--, 6o Sup. Ct. 736, 84. L. Ed. 659 (April z, 1940); Carlson v. California,
-U.S.-, 6o Sup. Ct. 746, 24- L. Ed. 668 (April 2z, 1940).
"That the Lovell doctrine was intended to go beyond the facts directly before the
Court has been demonstrated beyond all peradventure in the decisions of last fall. See
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the issue was necessarily involved in the dispute of DeJonge v. Oregon,5
the initial case to carry the torch of assembly liberty from Amendment
I to XIV.
The marked restriction in municipal power effected by this trend
of judicial decisions means the case-by-case pricking out of new
boundaries for the permissible scope of municipal regulation over assem-
blies. This process will be the more difficult inasmuch as litigation over
the assembly guaranty in the First Amendment, unlike that with respect
to freedom of speech and religious liberty, offers no constructive basis
on which to build. Indeed, the leading case, United States v. Cruik-
shank," was concerned with the extent of Federal power under Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and yields nothing as to the point of
final balance between governmental power and liberty of assembly
beyond the general proposition that the right was an inherent one
existent before the Constitution's adoption. It is apparent that in order
to cope with crime and traffic control, to mention only only two in-
stances, a certain measure of discretionary power is needed by local
officials. Responsive to this need, a New York court only recently sus-
tained the validity of legislation similar to that under consideration in
the principal case, but with respect to a situation involving a definite
obstruction to traffic. 7 The Hague case was distinguished from the
situation presented, the court holding that reasonable discretion in exer-
cising such power must be retained by the city. A much earlier Ohio
case,' 8 not confronted by the influence of the Jersey City litigation,
took a like view. It would appear probable, therefore, that the assembly
guaranty may be subordinated to regulation by the city when definitely
necessary for control of peace and order, and that under such circum-
stances legislation of this nature will be upheld. Yet the sweep of the
handbill decisions of last fall, which leave to municipalities little power
to control the modern pamphleteer, suggests that governmental authority
will not be tolerated beyond a narrow range.
How great will be government's retreat in this sector of civil
liberty's surging drive will depend in no small part upon the status
accorded the assembly guaranty independent of its association with free
speech and free press. Although there are few situations conceivable
Schneider v. State of New Jersey (Town of Irvington) 5 Young v. People of the State of
California; Snyder v. City of Milwaukee; Nichols v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
308 U.S. 147, 6o Sup. Ct. 146 L. Ed. 115 (1939).
25299 U.S. 353, 57 Sup. Ct. z55, 81 L. Ed. Z78 (1937).
169z U.S. 542, 23 L. Ed. 588 (875)-
'People v. Friedman, q4. N.Y.S. (zd) 389 (1939).
' Canton v. Robertson, 2o Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 241, z8 Ohio Dec. (N.P.) 66, 62 Ohio
L. Bull. 429 (917).
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where the assembly prerogative is itself the most important liberty
being protected, the principal case presents as clear-cut an illustration of
it standing alone as can be found; but even here it is barely possible that
the conversation of the group was a large consideration in the judicial
disposition of the case. The Hague and DeJonge decisions, though
ostensibly based solely on the protection of assembly, both involved
freedom of speech in quite the same degree. Thus, the greater the
importance of the presence of speech or press elements, the greater
probably will be the influence imputed to assembly.
Historical analysis of the assembly right shows that the Articles of
Confederation contained no provision whatsoever for the exercise of
this privilege, while heated debate accompanied its inclusion in the present
Constitution."0 A conflict exists among the authoritative writers as to
whether or not this was a right in itself in the English common law."0
A seeming qualification on the scope of the assembly guaranty, though
little has been made of it, is found in both state and national consti-
tutions. "The right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the government for a redress of grievances" is the wording of the final
clause in Amendment I of the Federal Constitution, while the Ohio
Constitution, by Article I, Section 3, permits assemblage "to consult
for the common good; to instruct their Representatives; and to petition
the General Assembly for the redress of grievances." The exercise
of the assembly right has never been confined specifically to the ends
so expressly provided, yet the latitude given the preceding unqualified
rights of free speech and press has never been attained. If this be ex-
plainable on the basis that assembly is only a necessary prerequisite to
the other liberties, then the present decisions add greatly to the import-
ance which may be expected of the assembly guaranty in the future,
but do not accord it an independent status. J.J.F.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW- RECENT INTERPRETATION OF
OHIO'S LIMITATION ON INDEBTEDNESS
Constitutional and statutory limitations on the creation of indebted-
ness by state and municipality,' although generally reflecting in their
origin a sound and commendable fiscal policy, have in recent years given
I Annals of Cong. 759.
* 'Jarret and Mund, The Right of Assembly (931) 9 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. I.
'6 MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (zd) ed. 1937) sec. 2364.
"There are . . . constitutional . . . statutory . . . and . . . charter provisions. (Some
provisions forbid) indebtedness in excess of a certain per cent of the value or assessed
value of the taxable property in the municipal area, and (others limit) indebtedness in
any one year to the income and revenue provided for such year, and (others contain)
both the first and second provisions."
